

In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle identifies five *ways of knowing*—also called the five *intellectual virtues* and more commonly known by their Latin names.

Habit	Description	Systematic Theology
νοῦς <i>Intelligentia</i> Self-sufficient insight	What is immediately self-evident, needing no demonstration	First principles given to it—like insight
ἐπιστήμη <i>Scientia</i> Knowledge	Needs to be demonstrated	Demonstrates conclusions—like knowledge
σοφία <i>Sapientia</i> Wisdom	Knows what to do with the conclusions and what they mean	Utilizes a variety of inferences—like wisdom
φρόνησις <i>Prudentia</i> Prudence	Has to do with things that are done	Directs action—like prudence
τέχνη <i>Ars</i> Art	Has to do with things that are made	Edifies the Church—like art

See Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics* 6, especially 6.3 (ἐπιστήμη), 6.4 (τέχνη), 6.5 (φρόνησις), 6.6 (νοῦς), and 6.7 (σοφία) [= Bekker, pp. 1139b–1141b].

Aristotle's Ten Categories

Philosophy

Aristotle developed an influential classification of the fundamental kinds or ways of being known as his “ten categories”—what medievals called the *praedicamenta*.¹ These lists have been viewed as itemizing (1) types of predicate, (2) highest of the genera, or (3) kinds of predication.²

Greek	Translations	Description	Example
<i>ousia / ti esti</i> what is it?	substance, essence	what-it-is; Aristotle's “primary substance,” i.e., non-accidental particulars (cf. <i>Categories</i> 2, “not predicated-of (said-of), not present-in”)	man, horse
<i>poson</i> how much?	quantity	the extension of an object, either discrete or continuous; this and the following are accidental particulars (“not predicated-of, present-in”)	two cubits long, three cubits long
<i>poion</i> what kind?	quality	the nature of an object	white, grammatical
<i>pros ti</i> in relation to what?	relation	the relation of one object to another	double, half, greater
<i>pou</i> where?	place	an object's position relative to its surroundings	in the market place, in the Lyceum
<i>pote</i> when?	time	an object's position relative to other events	yesterday, last year
<i>keisthai</i> to lie	position	being-in-a-position; a condition of rest resulting from an action (<i>poiein</i>)	lying, sitting
<i>echein</i> to have	state, possession, having	a condition of rest resulting from an affection (<i>paschein</i>)	shod (has-shoes-on), armed
<i>poiein</i> to make, to do	action, doing	the production of change in another object	to lance, to cauterize
<i>paschein</i> to suffer, to undergo	affection, passivity	being-affected; the reception of change from some other object	to be lanced, to be cauterized

¹ *Categories* 4, 1b25-2a4; *Topics* I.9, 103b20-25; other passages contain lists of eight, six, five, or four of the ten, focusing especially on the first four. ² Smith, Robin. “Logic.” *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 55-56.

External

Efficient Cause *Directive*

The process by which materials are made into something, by which it moves or makes something; the agent's actions that produce or move something (the object or process producing the object).

—e.g., the sculptor and his sculpting

1



Internal

Material Cause *Concrete*

That out of which a thing is made; the materials, the potentiality, the intrinsic principle that allows a thing to be changed into something else (what can be observed in the thing itself).

—e.g., the white-marble stone

2



Formal Cause *Abstract*

The form into which the materials were cast (so that they were not turned into something else), the intelligible structure or act of something (the intrinsic pattern or form of the object distinguishing it from all others).

—e.g., the person, King David

3




Final Cause *Quality*

That for which, or that on account of which, a thing came into being, the goal for which things evolve, or the end of some process or activity (the telic cause). This is the most important cause.

—e.g., the decorative element

4





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Sphere of action or feeling	Excess	Mean	Deficiency
Fear and confidence	Rashness <i>thrasutēs</i>	Courage <i>andreia</i>	Cowardice <i>deilia</i>
Pleasure and pain	Licentiousness <i>akolasia</i>	Temperance <i>sôphrosunē</i>	Insensibility <i>anaisthēsia</i>
Getting and spending (minor)	Prodigality <i>asōtia</i>	Liberality <i>eleutheriotēs</i>	Illiberality / Meanness <i>aneleutheria</i>
Getting and spending (major)	Vulgarity <i>apeirokalia, banausia</i>	Magnificence <i>megaloprepeia</i>	Pettiness <i>mikroprepeia</i>
Honor and dishonor (major)	Vanity <i>chaunotēs</i>	Magnanimity <i>megalopsuchia</i>	Pusillanimity <i>mikropsuchia</i>
Honor and dishonor (minor)	Ambition <i>philotimia</i>	Proper ambition ...	Unambitiousness <i>aphilotimia</i>
Anger	Irascibility <i>orgilotēs</i>	Patience <i>praotēs</i>	Lack of spirit <i>aorgēsia</i>
Self-expression	Boastfulness <i>alazoneia</i>	Truthfulness <i>alētheia</i>	Understatement <i>eirōneia</i>
Conversation	Buffoonery <i>bōmolochia</i>	Wittiness <i>eutrapelia</i>	Boorishness <i>agroikia</i>
Social conduct	Obsequiousness <i>areskeia</i> Flattery <i>kolakeia</i>	Friendliness <i>philia</i> (?)	Cantankerousness <i>duskolia (duseris)</i>
Shame	Shyness <i>kateplēxis</i>	Modesty <i>aidōs</i>	Shamelessness <i>anaischuntia</i>
Indignation	Envy <i>phthonos</i>	Righteous indignation <i>nemesis</i>	Malicious enjoyment <i>epichaïrekakia</i>

Chart based on: Aristotle. *The Nicomachean Ethics* (Penguin Classics). Ed. Hugh Tredennick. Trans. J. A. K. Thomson. New York: Penguin Classics, 2003. pp. 285-286. Illustration of rashness, courage, and cowardice modified from: Baird, Forrest E. *Ancient Philosophy* (Philosophic Classics, Volume I--4th Edition). Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002.